The War Debate in Parliament
London, Tuesday, April 4, 1854
A singularity of English tragedy, so repulsive to French feelings that Voltaire used to call Shakespeare a drunken savage[a], is its peculiar mixture of the sublime and the base, the terrible and the ridiculous, the heroic and the burlesque. But nowhere does Shakespeare devolve upon the Clown the task of speaking the prologue of a heroic drama. This invention was reserved for the Coalition Ministry. Mylord Aberdeen has performed, if not the English Clown, at least the Italian Pantaloon. All great historical movements appear, to the superficial observer, finally to subside into the farce, or at least the common-place. But to commence with this is a feature peculiar alone to the tragedy entitled, War with Russia, the prologue of which was recited on Friday evening[b] in both Houses of Parliament, where the Ministry's address in answer to Her Majesty's message[c] was simultaneously discussed and unanimously adopted, to be handed over to the Queen yesterday afternoon, sitting upon her throne in Buckingham Palace. The proceedings in the House of Lords may be very briefly delineated. Lord Clarendon made the Ministerial, and Lord Derby the Opposition statement of the case. The one spoke as the man in office, and the other like the man out of it.[d]
Lord Aberdeen, the noble Earl at the head of the Government, the "acrimonious" confidant of the Czar, the "dear, good, and excellent" Aberdeen of Louis Philippe, the "estimable gentleman" of Pius IX although concluding his sermon with his usual whinings for peace, caused, during the principal part of his performance, their lordships to be convulsed with laughter, by declaring war not on Russia, but on The Press[e], London weekly periodical. Lord Malmesbury retorted on the noble Earl; Lord Brougham, that "old, foolish woman," as he was styled by William Cobbett, discovered that the contest on which they were engaged was no "easy" one; Earl Grey, who, in his Christian spirit, had contrived to make the British Colonies the most miserable abodes of the world, reminded the British people that the tone and temper in which the war was referred to, the feeling of animosity evinced against the Czar and his Cossacks, was not the spirit in which a Christian nation ought to enter upon war. The Earl of Hardwicke was of opinion that England was weak in the means she, possessed for dealing with the Russian navy; that they ought not to have a less force in the Baltic- than 20 sail of the line, well armed and well manned, with disciplined crews, and not begin, as they had done, with a mob of newly raised men, a mob in a line of battle-ship (luring an action being the worst of all mobs. The Marquis of Lansdowne vindicated the Government, and expressed a hope as to the shortness and ultimate success of the war, because (and this is a characteristic mark of the noble lord's powers of conception) "it was no dynastic war, such a war involving the largest consequences, and which it was the most difficult to put an end to.
After this agreeable conversazione in which everybody had given his sentiment, the address was agreed to nemine contradicente[f]
All the new information to be gathered from this conversazione is limited to some official declarations on the part of Lord Clarendon, and the history of the secret memorandum of 1844.
Lord Clarendon stated that "at present the agreement with France consists simply of an exchange of notes containing arrangements with respect to military operations."
Consequently there exists, at this moment, no treaty between England and France. In reference to Austria and Prussia he stated that the former would maintain an armed neutrality, and the other a neutral neutrality; but that "with such a war as is now about to be waged upon the frontiers of both countries, it would be impossible for either power to preserve a neutrality." Finally he declared that the peace to be brought about by the impending war, would only be a glorious peace "if they did secure equal rights and immunities for the Christian subjects of Turkey."
Now we know that the Sheik-ul-Islam[g] has already been deposed for having refused to sanction by a fetva the treaty granting this equalization of rights; that the greatest excitement exists on the part of the old Turkish population at Constantinople; and by a telegraphic dispatch received to-day we learn that the Czar has declared to Prussia that he is willing to withdraw his troops from the Principalities if the Western Powers should succeed in imposing such a treaty upon the Porte[h]. All he wants is to break the Osman rule. If the Western Powers propose to do it in his stead, he, of course, is not the madman to wage war with them.
Now to the history of the secret memorandum, which I collect from the speeches of Derby, Aberdeen, Malmesbury and Granville. The memorandum was
"intended to be a provisional, conditional and secret arrangement between Russia, Austria and England, to make certain arrangements with respect to Turkey, which France, without any consent on her part, was to be obliged to concur in."
This memorandum, thus described in the words of Lord Malmesbury, was the result of private conferences between the Czar, the Earl of Aberdeen, the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel. It was by the advice of Aberdeen that the Czar addressed himself to the Duke and to Sir Robert Peel. It remains a matter of controversy between Lord Aberdeen and his opponents, whether the memorandum was drawn up by Count Nesselrode, on the return of the Czar to St. Petersburg subsequently to his visit to England in 1844, or whether it was drawn up by the English Ministers themselves as a record of the communications made by the Emperor.
The connection of the Earl of Aberdeen with this document was distinguished from that of a mere Minister with an official document as proved, according to the statement of Malmesbury, by another paper not laid before the House. The document was considered of the greatest importance, and such as might not be communicated to the other powers, notwithstanding Aberdeen's assurance that he had communicated the "substance" to France. The Czar, at all events, was not aware of such a communication having been made. The document was sanctioned and approved by the Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel. It was not brought under the cognizance and consideration of the Peel Cabinet, of which Lord Derby was at that time a member. It remained not with the ordinary papers of the Foreign Office, but in the private custody of each successive Secretary of State, with no copy of it whatever in the Foreign Office. When Lord Derby acceded to office, he knew nothing of it, although himself a member of the Peel Cabinet in 1844. When the Earl of Aberdeen left office, he handed it over in a box to Lord Palmerston, who handed the box of, Pandora over to his successor, Earl Granville, who, as he states himself, at the request of Baron Brunnow, the Russian Embassador, handed it over to the Earl of Malmesbury on his accession to the Foreign Office. But, in the meantime, there appears to have been an alteration, or rather a falsification in the original indorsement of the document, since the Earl of Granville sent it to the Earl of Malmesbury with a note stating that it was a memorandum drawn up by Baron Brunnow, as the result of the conferences between the Emperor of Russia, Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen, the name of the Duke of Wellington not being mentioned at all. No other motive can be supposed for this false allegation but the anxiety to conceal the importance of the memorandum by describing it as a mere annotation of the Embassador, instead of an official document issued from the Chancellory at St. Petersburg.
Such was the importance Russia attached to this document that 48 hours after Lord Malmesbury . had been in office, Baron Brunnow came and asked him whether he had read it; but Malmesbury had not then done so, it being not forwarded to him till a few days after. Baron Brunnow urged on him the necessity of reading this document, which he stated constituted the key of all conferences with Russia. From that moment, however, he never mentioned the document again to the Derbyites, apparently judging the Tory Administration too powerless or too transitory for carrying out the Russian policy. In December, 1852, the Derby Government went out, and shortly after the intelligence of the formation of the Coalition reaching St. Petersburg, on Jan. 11, the Czar again opened this question —a sufficient evidence this that he thought the cabinet of all the talents ready to act on the basis of this memorandum.
Here, then, we have the most compromising revelations made in the House of Lords by the most irreversible witnesses, all of them having been Prime or Foreign Ministers of Great Britain. An "eventual engagement" the expression used in the memorandum—is secretly entered into with Russia by an English Foreign Minister, not only without the sanction of Parliament, but behind the backs of his own colleagues, two of them only having been initiated into the mystery. The paper is for ten years withheld from the Foreign Office and kept in clandestine custody by each successive Foreign Minister. Whenever a ministry disappears from the scene, the Russian Embassador appears in Downing-st. and intimates to the new-comer that he had to look closely at the bond, the secret bond, entered into not between the nation as legally represented, but between some Cabinet-Minister and the Czar, and to act according to the line of conduct prescribed in a Russian memorandum drawn up in the Chancellory of St. Petersburg.
If this be not an open infraction of the Constitution, if not a conspiracy and high treason, if not collusion with Russia, we are at a loss to understand the meaning of these terms.
At the same time we understand from these revelations why the criminals, perfectly secure, are allowed to remain at the helm of the State, at the very epoch of an ostensible war with Russia, with whom they are convicted to have permanently conspired, and why the Parliamentary opposition is a mere sham, intended to annoy but not to impeach them. All Foreign Ministers, and consequently all the successive Administrations since 1844 are accomplices, each of them becoming so from the moment he neglected to accuse his predecessor and quietly accepted the mysterious box. By the mere affectation of secrecy each of them became guilty. Each of them became a party to the conspiracy by concealing it from Parliament. By law the concealer of stolen goods is as criminal as the thief. Any legal proceeding, therefore, would ruin not only the Coalition, but their rivals also, and not only these Ministers, but the Parliamentary parties they represent, and not only those parties, but the governing classes of England.
I may remark, en passant, that the only speech delivered in the House of Lords worth mentioning is that of the Earl of Derby; but his criticism of the memorandum and the secret correspondence and I may say the same with respect to the debate in the Commons contains nothing that I have not stated before in the full analysis I gave you of that fatal memorandum and that extraordinary correspondence.[i]
"The power of declaring war is a prerogative of the Crown, a real prerogative; and if Her Majesty summons her Parliament, and informs them that she has found it necessary to engage herself in war, it is not an occasion when the Commons enter on the policy or impolicy of the war. It is their duty, under such circumstances, to rally round the throne, and to take a proper, subsequent and constitutional occasion of commenting on the policy which may have led to the war."
So said Mr. Disraeli in the sitting of the Commons, and so said all the Commoners, and yet The Times fills seventeen columns with their comments on that policy. Why was this? Even because it was not the "occasion," because their talk would remain resultless. But we must except Mr. Layard, who stated plainly:
"If it should be the feeling of the House, after what he should state to them, that the conduct of the Ministers should force the subject of a Parliamentary inquiry, he should not shrink from the duty thus imposed upon him, and would be ready to ask the Ministers to fix an early day on which the matter might be brought forward."
You will comprehend now the reason why The Times begins to doubt the justice of the Assyrian discoveries of Mr. Layard.[j]
Lord J. Russell, who introduced the address in the House of Commons, distinguished himself from Lord Clarendon only by his intonation of the words integrity, liberty, independence, civilization, whereby he secured the cheers of his more common audience.
Mr. Layard, who rose to reply to him, committed two great blunders, which disfigured his otherwise remarkable speech. In the first place, he sought to establish the existence of opposite elements in the Coalition, the Russian element and the English element, the Aberdeen fraction and the Palmerston fraction, these two fractions possessing no other distinction than their language and their modes of subserviency to Russia. The one is a partisan of Russia, because he does not understand her and the other although he understands her. The former is, therefore, an open partisan, and the other a secret agent. The former, therefore, serves gratuitously, and the latter is paid. The former is less dangerous because placed in open antagonism to the feelings of the English people; the latter is fatal, because he makes himself pass for the incarnation of the national animosity against Russia. With Mr. Layard we must presume that it is ignorance of the man whom he places in opposition to Aberdeen. For Mr. Disraeli, who employed the same contrast, there is no such excuse. No man knows Lord Palmerston better than that chief of the Opposition, who declared already in 1844, that no foreign policy of any Minister had ever been so fatal to British interests as that of the noble Lord. The second blunder committed by Mr. Layard was his argument that The Times was the direct organ of the Aberdeen party because the secret and confidential correspondence, two or three days after arrival, furnished materials for its leading articles, which endeavoured to bring the country to consent to the nefarious transaction intended at St. Petersburg, especially its articles during February and March of last year. Layard would have done better to conclude with Lord Palmerston that those materials were furnished by the Russian Embassy at London, when he would have been able to charge both The Times and the Foreign Office with being the organs of the St. Petersburg Cabinet.
Holding the opinion that The Times is, in fact, a greater power than the Coalition not as to its opinions but as to the data which constitute the treasonable character of this secret correspondence, I subjoin the whole statement of Mr. Layard against that paper:
"The first of these secret dispatches was received in this country on the 23d of January, 1853, and on the 26th of the same month appeared in The Times the first of those articles to which he had referred. The next dispatch was received on the 6th of February, 1853, and on the 11th of the same month, four days afterward, there appeared an extraordinary article in The Times, from which he would now quote. In one part of the article it was stated:
"'We do not suppose that it is the intention or the policy of Russia to accelerate a catastrophe in the East, and the good offices of this country will again be employed to lessen the perils of a situation which is becoming critical. We cannot, however, forget that the attempt to prolong the brutal and decrepit authority of the Turks in Europe is purchased by the surrender of fine provinces and a large Christian population to barbarous misgovernment; and we shall rejoice when civilization and Christianity are able to repair the injuries of the Ottoman conquest.'
"Again, it was stated in The Times on the 23d of February, 1853, after various comments on the exhausted state of Turkey:
"'With the utmost political caducity, with a total want of ability and integrity in the men who are still its rulers, with a declining Mussulman population, and an exhausted treasury, the Porte unites as if by way of derisory contrast a dominion over some of the most fertile regions, the finest ports and the most enterprising and ingenious people of Southern Europe.... It is hard to comprehend how so great a positive evil can have been so long defended by politicians as a relative good; and, though we are not insensible to the difficulties attending any change in the territories of so huge an empire, we are disposed to view with satisfaction rather than with alarm the approach of a period'"
How did The Times know the period was approaching?
"'when it will be impossible to prolong the dominion of such a Government as that of the Porte over such a country as that which is now subject to its authority. Perhaps that period is less distant than is commonly supposed; and it may be the part of wise statesmen to provide against such a conjuncture, which it is beyond their power indefinitely to postpone. We do not believe, and we do not mean to imply, that any combination of Austria and Russia, hostile to the territorial claims of the Ottoman Empire, is now in existence, or is likely to be formed without the knowledge of the other European powers. We have strong grounds to believe'"
When The Times says that we know what it means—
"'that Prince Menchikoff is sent from St. Petersburg to Constantinople upon a special embassy, for the express purpose of declaring, in the name of the Emperor Nicholas, that as head of the Greek Church he cannot submit, or allow the Eastern Church to submit, to the conditions of the firman recently obtained by the French Embassador with reference to the Holy Shrines in the Holy Land.'
"Now, the first intimation of Prince Menchikoff's mission was contained in Sir H. Seymour's dispatches, received February 14 and February 21. It was important to observe that on the 6th of March, 1853, arrived the dispatch giving the whole of the Emperor of Russia's plan for the partition of Turkey. The answer to it, as he had before said, was not returned before the 23d of March, and no Cabinet Council was held until the 13th of March, though certain members of the Government had seven days previously received the Emperor's proposal. That proposal was not submitted to their colleagues till the 13th of March, but it had been previously submitted to The Times, for on the 7th of March, the morning following the receipt of the dispatch, which then could not have been known to more than two or three members of the Cabinet, and which could not then have been seen by any clerk in the Foreign Office, there appeared a particular article in The Times. (Hear, hear.) The article said, among other things, that
"'The state of the Turkish Empire and the relations of the European Powers to the East are subjects on which it may be useful for reflecting politicians and the independent press to form and express opinions, though the consummation to which these opinions point be still unwelcome and remote. Statesmen, bound to transact the business of the day, and to recognize at every turn the obligations of what is called State necessity, are restrained within narrower limits, and would probably be unable to give effect to any novel or original conception if it had not previously been entertained by the mind and reason of the public.'
"He entreated the noble Lord to mark the words which followed, for they referred to the objection which he had offered.
"'We are therefore by no means surprised that, in adverting to the differences which have recently taken place in Turkey, and especially on its European frontiers, Lord John Russell should have expressed his dissent from the opinions which have been recently put forward on this subject, and should have repeated in his place in Parliament, speaking under the weight of official responsibility, the old story of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. We ourselves, however, are not affected by similar considerations.'
"How did the writer know that the noble Lord dissented? (Hear.) The article proceeded:
"'We do not, therefore, concur in the opinion of Lord J. Russell that no greater calamity could occur to Europe at the present time than the necessity of considering what ought to be done in such a case as the dismemberment of that empire.'
"Let the House mark the following words, for they were almost identical with those of the Emperor of Russia:
"'It would, we think, be a far greater calamity that the dismemberment commenced before any such consideration had taken place.'
"(Hear, hear.) They were the very words. The writer went on thus:
"And here we must be allowed to express our surprise that any statesman should, for an instant, confound the policy which it might be proper to pursue in the event of a dissolution of the Turkish Empire with that which led to the partition of Poland. No doubt the argument of State necessity still remains to support the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire; but that argument stands alone against a host of evils, and it means, in reality, no more than the fear of dealing with a momentous and uncertain question. Yet, so strange are the prepossessions on this subject which have been fostered, especially of late years, that an attempt to discuss this question on its own merits is viewed in some quarters as an act of political depravity, and a violation of all the laws which bind nations together.'
"The next article appeared on the 10th of March. The House might, perhaps, have been of opinion that hitherto he had not shown that the writer in The Times employed the exact words used in the dispatches; but the article he was about to read would remove all doubt upon that point. On the 10th of March an article appeared in The Times commencing with these words:
"'Prince Menchikoff arrives in a more strictly diplomatic capacity, and we have reason to believe that his instructions are more conciliatory than those of Count Leiningen.'
"A similarity of expression would be found in Sir H. Seymour's dispatch of the 21st of February:
"'His Excellency (Count Nesselrode) wished to assure me that the instructions with which Prince Menchikoff would be provided were of a conciliatory nature.'
"The article continued:
"'We must venture to say that it implies some penury of resources in modern statesmen that, when they have to deal with a question which involves the civilization of great provinces, the restoration of Christianity itself to that supremacy which it once enjoyed in all parts of Europe, and the progressive welfare of millions of human beings, the only expedient on which they can agree is to dress up a Turk's head in a turban, and agree to treat it as if it was still a symbol of force and empire.'
"A Cabinet Council was held on the 19th of March, at which the dispatch received on the 6th of that month was discussed, and an answer to it was returned on the 23d of March, containing this passage:
"'Although Her Majesty's Government feel compelled to adhere to the principles and the policy laid down in Lord John Russell's dispatch of the 9th of February, yet they gladly comply with the Emperor's wish, that the subject should be further and frankly discussed.'
"On the same day an article appeared in The Times, in which some of the phrases used in Lord Clarendon's dispatch might be found. The article commenced thus
"'The opinions we have expressed on the present condition and future prospects of the Ottoman Empire do not coincide with the views entertained by Lord J. Russell, and communicated by him to the House of Commons; they differ from the course of policy which this country has pursued in former times and on several occasions; and they are entirely at variance with the system which a large numerical proportion of the London press is attempting, not very brilliantly or successfully, to defend.'
"Honour to the British press that, though wanting the brilliant epigrammatic pen which had shaken a Colonial Minister and almost upset a Cabinet, it did not support the views of The Times. The Times added near the end of its article:
"'He (the Emperor) has said that it is an object of his ambition to stand well with this country, and to deserve its confidence. His proceedings on this occasion will bring that assurance to the test, and he can give us no greater proof of moderation and good. faith toward Turkey and the rest of Europe than a willingness to cooperate on these subjects, as he has. before done, with the British Government.
"On the same day on which The Times announced that its endeavors to reconcile the British public to the partition of Turkey had failed, the answer to the dispatch which had been delayed for 16 days was sent to St. Petersburg. (Hear, hear.) He need not trouble the House with further extracts from The Times."
Mr. Bright supported the character of Mr. Cobden, in order to afford another opportunity to Lord Palmerston to gather popularity by abuse of Russia and sham-energetic defence of the war-policy. Among other things Palmerston stated:
"Now, it is known, I think, to those who have given their attention to the affairs of Europe for a considerable time past, that the views of Russia upon Turkey are not of yesterday, or indeed of any recent date. (Hear.) It is known that for a great length of time it has been the standing and established policy of Russia to endeavour to obtain possession of at least the European part of Turkey, and subsequently of Asiatic Turkey. This policy has been pursued with undeviating and systematic perseverance. It has been ever kept in view. When opportunities have offered, steps in advance have been made, and when checks have been experienced, those steps have been withdrawn; but only for the purpose of taking advantage of the next opportunity which offers. (Hear, hear.) Delay has been no element in mitigating or in inducing Russia to abandon its schemes. Its policy has been to keep one object in view—not to hurry, not to lose its object by prematurely grasping at its possession, but to watch the course of the other Governments of Europe, and to take advantage of every opportunity which might present itself, by which it could get even the slightest advance toward the ultimate object of its ambition."
Now compare this declaration of Lord Palmerston with those he made in 1829, '30, '31, '33, '36, '40, '41, '42, '43, '46, '48, '49, and you will find that the above is less a reply to Mr. Bright than to his own former policy. But while this cunning foe, by such onslaughts upon Russia, conciliates the sympathies of the public, he on the other hand secures favor with the Czar, by the following observation:
"Now, Sir, do I blame the Russian Government for entertaining such a policy? A policy of aggrandizement pursued by legitimate means is a policy which you may condemn as dangerous to yourselves, which you may oppose as destructive of the independence and the liberties of other States, but which is not a reproach to the Government which pursues it, provided it be pursued by open, undisguised, and avowed means, without concealment, without subterfuge, and without fraud. Now, the course which, I am sorry to say, the Russian Government has pursued in all these recent transactions has not been that open and straightforward course which would justify it in avowing and in boldly declaring its policy."
But the only reproach to be made against the Russian Government was just, as Mr. Disraeli termed it, her fatal frankness. Palmerston, accordingly, by disapproving only of what Russia did not do, justifies entirely that which she really has done.
Mr. Disraeli's criticism of the secret papers was clever, as usual, but missed its effect by his declaration that it was out of place, and that his only intention. in addressing the House was to support the address. It is painful to see a man of his genius cajoling a Palmerston, not only in the House, but also in his reputed organ, The Press, from so sordid a motive as the politics of place and party.
In yesterday's sitting of the House, Sir J. Graham stated that he had received intelligence that the fleet had entered the Black Sea, and was in the neighborhood of Varna.[k]
In the House of Lords, Lord Aberdeen gave notice that on Tuesday, the 11th, he. should move the adjournment of the House till Thursday, 27th inst.
Written on April 4, 1854
Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4055, April 17;
Reprinted in the New-York Weekly Tribune, No. 658, April 22, 1854
Voltaire. Dissertation sur la tragédie ancienne et moderne (Preface to the tragedy Sémiramis).—Ed.
March 31, 1854.—Ed.
See this volume, p. 100.—Ed.
Marx analyses the debate in Parliament according to the report published in The Times, No. 21704, April 1, 1854.—Ed.
The reference is to Lord Russell's polemic with the London Press on the history of the 1844 memorandum.—Ed.
Arif Hikmet Bey.—Ed.
Telegraphic dispatch from Berlin of April 3. The Times, No. 21706, April 4, 1854.—Ed.
See this volume, pp. 73-83 and 84-99.—Ed.
The Times, No. 21705, April 3, 1854, leader.—Ed.
Sir J. Graham's speech in the House of Commons on April 3, 1854. The Times, No. 21706, April 4, 1854.—Ed.
In Marx's Notebook the dispatch of this article is dated April 4, but its contents, in contrast to other entries, are not disclosed. The editors published a lesser part of this article as a leader (see Note 98?) and the greater part as a separate article under the title "The War Debate in Parliament". The latter, like the rest of Marx's articles which the editors published over his signature, was preceded by "From Our Own Correspondent", but Marx's signature was omitted, presumably due to negligence.
"The War Debate in Parliament" was published in Die Reform, a German-language newspaper of American workers, between April 20 and 22, 1854 (the editors of this edition are not in possession of this text). Eleanor
Marx included it in abridged form in The Eastern Question under the title "The War with Russia".
The reference is to John Aberdeen's Coalition Ministry of 1852-55 (the Cabinet of All the Talents), which consisted of Whigs, Peelites and representatives of a faction of Irish Members.
Marx made a detailed analysis of Lord Palmerston's foreign policy in his pamphlet Lord Palmerston written between October and early December 1853 (see present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 341-406).
 This article by Marx and Engels was initially a part of "The War Debate in Parliament" (see Note 101↓) sent by Marx to New York on April 4, 1854. The editors of the Tribune extracted three paragraphs of this article and published them separately as a leader. The editors' interference with the original text of Marx and Engels can be easily traced:
The beginning of the article, up to the words "but this report our well-informed London correspondent pronounces a mere stock-jobbing invention", belongs to the editors. The greater part of the first paragraph, from the words "In fact, it seems perfectly clear..." up to the end, was written by Engels; textually it coincides with Engels' letter to Marx of April 3, 1854 (present edition, Vol. 39). The rest of the paragraph was written by Marx.
The editors similarly dealt with Marx's second paragraph as can be seen by comparing it with the fourth and fifth paragraphs of "The War Debate in Parliament"; it is more difficult to establish the degree of their interference here, though it is almost beyond doubt in the sentence: "Had these terms been openly proffered sooner they might have greatly diminished the chances of the war, as there is no doubt that the allies mean to procure just such an emancipation." The last sentence "on that head we shall doubtless have full information by the next steamer" also belongs to the editors.
The contents of the third paragraph in the main coincide with Marx's articles "The Greek Insurrection", "Declaration of War.— On the History of the Eastern Question" and also "Greece and Turkey.— Turkey and the Western Powers.—Falling Off in Wheat Sales in England" written later (see this volume, pp. 70-72, 100-08 and 159-62).
Source: Marx and Engels Collected Works, Volume 13
(pp.132-142), Progress Publishers, Moscow 1980.