Palmerston.—The Army^[5]

London, February 9. Following their acceptance of new ministerial posts, Palmerston and Sidney Herbert have to submit to the formality of re-election to their parliamentary seats. For this reason both Houses were yesterday adjourned for a week. The statements by Lord Derby and the Marquis of Lansdowne in the House of Lords concerning the secret history of the ministerial crisis merely retold an oft-told tale[a]. The sole item of importance was a remark by Derby which contained the key to Lord Palmerston's position. Palmerston is known to have no parliamentary party behind him, or any clique masquerading under that name. Whigs, Tories and Peelites[6] regard him with equal suspicion. The Manchester School[7] is in open conflict with him. His personal supporters among the Mayfair Radicals[8] (as distinct from the Manchester Radicals) number a dozen at the most. Who and what, then, enables him to impose himself on the Crown and on Parliament? His popularity? No more so than unpopularity prevented Gladstone, Herbert, Graham and Clarendon from again seizing the helm of state. Or is the man who never belonged to a party, served all of them alternately, deserted them all in turn and invariably held the balance between them, is he the natural leader of defunct parties which seek to stem the tide of history by forming a coalition? This fact proves nothing at the present moment, since it was insufficient to put Palmerston rather than Aberdeen at the head of the coalition in 1852.

Derby has supplied the' answer to the riddle. Palmerston is evidently Bonaparte's friend. His premature recognition of the coup d'état in December 1851 was then ostensibly the reason for his expulsion from the Whig Ministry[9]. Bonaparte therefore regards him as persona grata, and a trustworthy man. The alliance with Bonaparte is therefore decisive at the moment. Palmerston has thus used foreign affairs to tip the balance of ministerial groupings and not for the first time, as closer examination of the history of British ministries between 1830 and 1852 would show.

Since at present the situation of the Crimean army can no longer be exploited for the purpose of cabinet intrigues, Lord John Russell went back on his pessimistic opinion in yesterday's sitting in the Commons, allowed the strength of the British army to grow by some 10,000 men and exchanged congratulations with the God-fearing Gladstone[b]. Despite this "parliamentary resurrection" of the British army, there can be no doubt that at the present moment it has ceased to exist as an army. Some few thousand are still listed as "fit for service" because there is no room in the hospitals to receive them. Out of 100,000 the French still number some 50,000, but what are 50,000 or 60,000 men to hold Heracleatic Chersonese through the winter, to blockade the south side of Sevastopol, to defend the trenches and to take the offensive in the spring with those who are left? The French may hold in readiness fresh divisions for embarkation in March, but they are busy preparing for a spring campaign on the continent, and there is every probability that their shipments will be too few or will arrive too late.

That the English and French governments are helpless, indeed have given up the army in the Crimea for lost, is apparent from the two measures to which they have resorted in order to remedy their misfortunes.

In order to make good the error of having undertaken the expedition four months too late, they are committing the incomparably greater error of sending to the Crimea, the only remnants of the Turkish army that are still serviceable, four months after their own arrival and in mid-winter. This army, already broken and in the process of disintegration at Shumla as a consequence of the neglect, incompetence and corruption of the Turkish government, will in the Crimea melt away with cold and hunger to an extent which will even surpass British achievements in this field.

As soon as the Russians have attained their full concentration and the weather permits field operations, they will probably first attack the Turks under Omer Pasha. This is expected by the British and French. Thus conscious are they of the unenviable position they have assigned to them. Thus clearly do they show that the strategic error of now throwing the Turks in on the northern side was committed with open eyes? The Turks would only be able to save themselves from ultimate destruction by the most incomprehensible errors on the part of the Russians.

Secondly, the Anglo-French have hired 15,000 Piedmontese for the purpose of swelling the sparse ranks of the British; they are to be fed by the British Commissariat. In 1848 and 1849 the Piedmontese showed themselves to be brave and good soldiers. For the most part mountain-dwellers, their infantry surpasses even the French in skirmishing, sniping and fighting on broken terrain. The plains of the Po on the other hand have produced a cavalry which bears comparison with the British Horse Guards. Finally, they have had a hard schooling in the most recent revolutionary campaigns. These fleet-footed, mobile, adroit little fellows are fit for anything, but not to be British soldiers, which is what they are to be turned into, nor for the direct, ponderous frontal attacks which are the only tactics Raglan knows. And on top of that, to be fed by a British Commissariat whose only previous experience was of feeding itself! The 15,000 Piedmontese will therefore probably prove to be a further blunder.

British reinforcements have been suspended for the present. Raglan himself appears to be refusing them, as he cannot even cope with the remnants he still has. It is hardly believable that the more the British camp is afflicted with disease, overwork and lack of rest, the more prevalent becomes the admirable practice of corporal punishment. Men who are fit only to be sent to hospital, who for weeks have slept and been on duty in wet clothes and on wet ground and have borne all this with almost superhuman tenacity if these men are caught dozing in the trenches, they are treated to the cat-o'-nine-tails and the birch. "Fifty strokes for every vagabond!"—that is the only strategic order that Lord Raglan occasionally issues. Is it any wonder then that the soldiers of the perpetrator of the famous "flanking-march" to Balaklava follow suit and evade the birch with a "flanking-march" to the Russians? Desertions to the Russian camp are becoming more numerous every day, as The Times correspondent reported.[c]

All the big talk about storming Sevastopol has of course ceased. The Russian army would first have to be beaten in the field. Thus Wellington twice raised the siege of Badajoz to march against a relief army. We have furthermore already seen that the newly-erected Russian defence works make it impossible for the place to be taken by storm[d]. Finally, the most recent Russian sorties prove that the allied army is at present superior to the Russians only in artillery. As long as sorties cannot be prevented, any idea of storming is absurd; besiegers who are incapable of confining the besieged to the area of the actual fortress are even less capable of seizing the fortress in hand-to-hand combat. Thus the besiegers will continue to vegetate, confined to their camp by their own weakness and by the Russian army in the field. They will continue to melt away, whilst the Russians bring up fresh forces. The prelude to the European war being enacted in the Crimea will end with the destruction of the allied troops unless some completely unexpected resources, which cannot be foreseen, are discovered.

Notes

[14] The Corn Laws, the first of which were passed as early as the fifteenth century, imposed high import duties on agricultural products in order to maintain high prices for these products on the domestic market. The Corn Laws served the interests of the big landowners. The struggle between the industrial bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy over the Corn Laws ended in their repeal in June 1846.