The European Struggle^[136]

The all-absorbing facts in the news brought by the Atlantic, are t he breaking off of the Vienna Conferences[137], and the partial if not total separation of Austria from the Allies. For both of these events we were not unprepared. The rejection by Russia of any plan of settlement which should not substantially admit all she claimed before the war, was, in the present state of that war, a matter of course. The return of Austria to her old expectant, wavery policy was also the result of certain circumstances of great importance, which we proceed to explain.

The French Government discovered some time since, and the fact could not be denied by the British Cabinet, that Lord John Russell had committed a great blunder at Vienna[a] in allowing those of the points before the Conference in which Austria was directly interested to be first disposed of. These points were the freedom of the Danube and the question of the Principalities. From this moment Austria appeared satisfied. Expecting, as she does, to share sooner or later in the partition of Turkey—Servia, Bosnia, and Albania are provinces which she cannot allow to fall into any other hands than her own. It is her interest to keep the question respecting the Christians in Turkey an open one. And as she can never expect to cope with Russia's naval power in the Black Sea, she has but little interest in humiliating her in that quarter. From this point of view, then, Austria has every reason to be satisfied with what she has obtained, and to turn the weight of her seemingly impartial arbitration against England and France. But this diplomatic success has very little to do with her present wavering. The cause of this is of a far more overpowering nature.

Some six months ago we alluded to the private and confidential dispatch by which Nicholas informed both Austria and Prussia, that in case they allied themselves with the West against him he would reply to such a treaty of alliance by a proclamation of Hungarian independence and Polish restoration[b]. At that time, and whenever we have considered the chances of a war in Poland and Volhynia, we have always taken into consideration the great military advantage which such a proclamation might give to Russia, if put forth after the conquest of Galicia and from the heights of the Carpathians, with Hungary open to her victorious armies. On that account, especially, we have always pointed out the fact that Austria could not undertake a war against Russia unless she was in a state at once to take the offensive and to parry, by successful battles and an advance upon Russia, the effects of such a proclamation[c]. So long, therefore, as the Austrian army in Galicia and the Principalities was strong enough to march upon Warsaw or Kiev there was little immediate danger from such a step.

This dispatch of Nicholas has, however, as we now' learn, lately been followed up by another from his successor, which contains quite different and far more serious menaces. The moment Austria shall irrevocably ally herself to the West, it says, or commit any overt act of hostility against Russia, Alexander II will place himself at the head of the Panslavist movement, and change his title of Emperor of all the Russians into that of Emperor of all the Slavonians.

At last! Let Alexander take such a step, and the struggle concerning the Christians in Turkey, the independence of the Porte, Sevastopol, the Principalities, and other such local trifles, may now be considered at an end. This declaration of Alexander's is the first plain-spoken word since the war began; it is the first step toward placing the war upon the continental theater, and giving it, frankly and openly, that European character which has hitherto been lurking behind all sorts of pretexts and pretenses, protocols and treaties, Vattel phrases and Pufendorf quotations[d]. Turkey—her independence and existence—is thrown into the back-ground. Who is to rule in Constantinople? would then no longer be the question—but who is to command all Europe? The Slavonic race, long divided by internal contests; repelled toward the East by Germans; subjugated, in part, by Turks, Germans, Hungarians; quickly reuniting its branches, after 1815, by the gradual rise of Panslavism, would then for the first time assert its unity, and, in doing so, declare war to the knife against the Romano-Celtic and Germanic races which have hitherto ruled the Continent. Panslavism is not a movement which merely strives after national independence; it is a movement which, thus acting upon Europe, would tend to undo what a thousand years of history have created; which could not realize itself without sweeping from the map Hungary, Turkey and a large part of Germany. Moreover, it must subjugate Europe in order to secure the stability of these results, if they are ever obtained. Panslavism is now, from a creed, turned into a political programme, or rather a vast political menace, with 800,000 bayonets to support it.

Nor are these 800,000 soldiers all the forces it could command. A word from the Russian Emperor at the head of an army, marching upon the Carpathians, and nine or ten millions of Slavonians in Austria would be agitated as in 1848; a victory over the Austrians, and they would be in full insurrection; while Hungary and Italy would be hardly less plowed by revolutionary agitation. Here is a danger which might well make Francis Joseph pause; for unless he could at once defeat the great Slavonian army on his frontiers and carry the war into the enemy's country, he might as well give up the contest before entering the lists.

Notes

[34] A reference to the talks between the British, French and Russian Ambassadors and Austrian Foreign Minister Buol sponsored by Emperor Francis Joseph, which opened in December 1854. Their official purpose was to work out a basis for peace negotiations between the belligerents in the Crimean War. They were a sequel to an earlier round of talks between diplomats of the Western Powers, the Prussian Ambassador and the Austrian Minister (the Russian Ambassador refused to participate) held in Vienna in 1853-54 by way of mediation in the Russo-Turkish conflict. The second round failed to resolve the differences between the belligerents in the Crimean War. In mid-March 1855 representatives of Austria, Britain, France, Turkey and Russia met at a higher level at the Vienna Conference (Britain was represented by Special Envoy Lord John Russell, France by Foreign Minister Drouyn de Lhuys). That conference also produced no results (see Note 88↑).