A Critique of the Crimean Affair.—
From Parliament

Today's Morning Herald[e] asserts positively that the expedition has been recalled because Bonaparte has revived his dangerous idea of storming Sevastopol from the south side. We do not doubt for a moment that the military genius of the Tuileries is obsessed by this idée fixe, but we cannot persuade ourselves that even a simple sabreur[f] such as Pélissier is capable of carrying out such a senselessly ruinous plan. Hence we believe that it has been decided to attempt a mass crossing of the Chernaya and that it was deemed inadvisable to split the main force by detaching a corps of 12,000 men. In fact, instead of detaching these 12,000 men, just before the army sets out, 15,000-20,000 Turks ought to be embarked in Eupatoria and incorporated into the main army, only leaving behind a garrison of sufficient size to hold the place. As stated in an earlier letter[g], the entire success of the campaign depends on the strength of the army that crosses the Chernaya. However that may be, the recall of the Kerch expedition is fresh evidence of the uncertainty and vacillation and the shilly-shallying bungling that are nowadays passed off as "idées napoléoniennes".[h]

Meanwhile the heroes improvised for the purpose of the coup d'état wear out with incredible rapidity. The array was headed by Espinasse, who after his ignominious campaign in the Dobrudja[160] was forced by the Zouaves to retreat head over heels to Paris. This Espinasse is the same man who, after being entrusted with guarding the building of the National Assembly, handed it over to its enemies[161]. The second in the line of descent was Leroy, alias Saint-Arnaud, the War Minister of December 2. He was followed by Forey, so bold in the persecution of the unfortunate peas-ants of south-east France, and so considerately humane towards the Muscovites. The army's suspicion that he was revealing the secrets of the French Council of War to the Russians made it necessary to remove him from the Crimea to Africa. Finally Canrobert was demoted on account of notorious incompetence. The irony of history has appointed Pélissier as his successor, and thus more or less commander-in-chief of the Anglo-French army—the same Pélissier of whom in 1841 it was asserted over and over again in Parliament, in London officers' clubs and at country-meetings[i], in The Times and in Punch, that no honourable English officer could ever serve alongside "that ferocious monster"[j]. And now the British Army is not only serving alongside him, but under him—the entire British Army! Just after the Whigs and their Foreign Secretary Palmerston had been defeated by the Tories, Palmerston called a meeting of his constituents in Tiverton and proved his right to break the Anglo-French alliance and unite with Russia by the fact that the French government, that Louis Philippe was employing such a "monster" as Pélissier in his service. It must be admitted that while the French Army is paying dearly for its revolt in December, things are not all "roses" for England either, in its alliance with the restored empire.

The Ministry suffered a defeat in the Commons yesterday, which proves nothing except that Parliament occasionally avenges itself on the Ministers for the scorn it enjoys "out of doors"[k]. A certain Mr. Wise tabled the motion, that

"it is the opinion of this House that complete revision of our diplomatic establishments recommended in the report of the Select Committee of 1850 on official Salaries should be carried into effect".[l]

Mr. Wise is a friend of Palmerston. His motion has been drifting about on the agenda of the House for about two years without coming up for discussion. Chance yesterday cast it before the discontented Commons. Wise made his speech, thinking that, after a few remarks by Palmerston, he would be able to play the usual game and withdraw his motion. But in contravention of the agreement Mr. Baillie picked up the motion that Wise had dropped and it was carried, despite Wise and Palmerston, by a majority of 112 to 57. This defeat did not in the least worry an old experienced tactician like Palmerston for he knows that in order to preserve an appearance of independence the House must occasionally condemn a ministerial motion to death and promote an anti-ministerial motion to life. Disraeli's motion, on the other hand, had the effect of an electric shock on the ministerial benches[162]. Palmerston himself, a master at parliamentary play-acting, congratulated "the writers and actors of this unforgettable scene". This was not irony. It was the involuntary tribute of an artist to his rival when the latter beats him at his own game. In the Monday sitting[m] Palmerston had toyed so skilfully with Milner Gibson and Gladstone and Herbert and Bright and Lord Vane that it seemed certain that all debates on foreign policy would be postponed until after Whitsun, the Ministry and House being obliged to proceed in a particular manner, and that the noble Viscount could be sure of a dictatorship of several weeks' duration. The only day still available for debate, Thursday[n], was reserved for Layard's reform motion. So no one could prevent Palmerston from concluding peace over Whitsun and, as he has done more than once, surprising the House when it re-assembled with one of his notorious treaties. The House, for its own part, might not have been unwilling to submit to this fate of surprise. Peace made behind its back, even peace a tout prix, was acceptable with a few post festum gestures of protest for decency's sake. But the moment the House and the Ministry were obliged to declare their views before the adjournment, the latter could no longer spring any surprises, nor the former let itself be taken unawares. Hence the consternation when Disraeli got up and tabled his motion and Layard relinquished his day to Disraeli. This "conspiracy between Layard and Disraeli", as the Post called the affair, thus brought to naught all the skilful manoeuvring since the "end" of the Vienna Conference, which has not yet been concluded.[163]

Notes

[34] A reference to the talks between the British, French and Russian Ambassadors and Austrian Foreign Minister Buol sponsored by Emperor Francis Joseph, which opened in December 1854. Their official purpose was to work out a basis for peace negotiations between the belligerents in the Crimean War. They were a sequel to an earlier round of talks between diplomats of the Western Powers, the Prussian Ambassador and the Austrian Minister (the Russian Ambassador refused to participate) held in Vienna in 1853-54 by way of mediation in the Russo-Turkish conflict. The second round failed to resolve the differences between the belligerents in the Crimean War. In mid-March 1855 representatives of Austria, Britain, France, Turkey and Russia met at a higher level at the Vienna Conference (Britain was represented by Special Envoy Lord John Russell, France by Foreign Minister Drouyn de Lhuys). That conference also produced no results.