The New Treaty between France and England

London, Jan. 28, 1860

The commercial treaty with France[270] will not be communicated to the House of Commons before the 6th of February. Still, with what was broached during the address debates—with what is insinuated by the French papers, and with what is gossiped at London and Paris, one may, Mr. Gladstone's solemn warnings[a] notwithstanding, already venture upon some general appreciation of this "sweet changeling."[271] It was on Monday, the 23d of January, that the treaty was duly signed at Paris, Rouher, Minister of Commerce, and Baroche, ad interim Minister of Foreign Affairs, acting as its French godfathers, while, on the part of England, the same function was performed by Lord Cowley and Mr. Cobden. That Mr. Michel Chevalier—the ex-St. Simonian—had his hand in the pie, and that general regret is felt throughout the whole realm of France that Louis Napoleon had not the tact of allowing this distinguished personage (viz.: Mr. Chevalier) to inscribe his name to the treaty by the side of his "English confrère"[b], is a piece of news which that "distinguished personage" himself was so condescending as to send over to London and have inserted in the various free-trade organs. But, what is not known by the journals, is that Père Enfantin, the ex-high-priest of St. Simonism, was the principal actor on the French side. Is it not truly wonderful how those St. Simonians, from Père Enfantin down to Isaac Péreire and Michel Chevalier, have been turned into the main economical pillars of the second Empire. But to return to Mr. Chevalier's "English confrère", the Lancashire ex-manufacturer, who, of course, felt not a little elated at the honor of putting his own sign-manual to an international treaty. If one should consider the circumstance that reciprocity treaties, and commercial treaties generally, save the treaties with barbarians, have always been loudly denounced by the English free-traders, led by Mr. Cobden, as the worst and most perfidious form of protectionism; if it be further considered that the present treaty, even judged from the reciprocity stand-point, seems a rather ludicrous arrangement; and, lastly, if the political aims and purposes the treaty is destined to screen be duly weighed, people might feel inclined to pity Mr. Richard Cobden as the innocent victim of a Palmerstonian machination. Yet there is another side to the medal. Mr. Cobden, as is generally known, did once receive, in exchange for his Anti-Corn law[272] success, some £60,000 sterling on the part of the grateful manufacturing interest. Mr. Cobden invested the principal in American shares, and, consequent upon the crisis of 1857, lost almost everything. The hopes he still cherished when setting out on his voyage to the United States, proved delusory. Mr. Cobden returned to England a ruined man. To appeal to a national subscription some national pretext was wanted, some transaction that might be puffed, and again exhibit Mr. Cobden in the light of the guardian angel of the United Kingdom, "securing plenty and comfort to millions of lowly households." Well, the Anglo-French treaty did the thing, and, as you will see, from the provincial papers, a new subscription to the amount of £40,000, intended to compensate the great free-trade apostle for his American losses, already goes the round very "feelingly." There is no doubt that if Disraeli, for instance, had introduced to the Commons such a treaty, Mr. Cobden at the head of the free-traders would have risen to move for a vote of non-confidence in a Cabinet attempting to carry the legislation back to the darkest fallacies of the unenlightened past.

From the following tables[c] the number of protective duties levied during the year 1858 by England on French articles may be inferred:

Most of the duties thus levied were protective duties, as those on lace, boots, gloves, silks, etc. Others, like the duties on brandy, etc., were higher than the English excise duty on British spirits, and so far protective. Even mere duties for revenue, such as the duty on wine, might be considered by a impossible to levy taxes on a foreign article without protecting consequent free-trader as protective duties, because it is almost some similar, if not identical, article in the home market. For instance, a revenue duty on foreign wine may be considered a protective duty for native beer, etc. By dint of the treaty just concluded all British duties on French manufactures will be abolished at once, while the duties on brandy, wine, and other articles, will be assimilated to English excise duties, or to the Custom-House duty now raised on similar products (wine for instance) if introduced from British colonies. On the other hand, the French changes of tariff will not be completely carried out before October, 1861, as will be seen from the following statement, borrowed from a French Government paper[d]:

Save the reduction of the duty on English coal to the same rate now paid by Belgian coal, all the concessions apparently made by - France appear of a very equivocal character. The price of a tun of pig iron No. 1 (Wales) amounts, for instance, at present, to £3 10/, but the French duty on iron will amount to nearly another £3. That the 30 per cent ad valorem duty on prohibited articles will be virtually protective is conceded by the London Economist. So far as the reductions, real or apparent, on English articles are put off to future periods, the English Government acts, in fact, the part of an insurance office for Louis Napoleon's tenure of power for the terms specified. The true secret, however, of the commercial treaty, viz.: that "it is no commercial treaty at all", but a simple hoax, intended to puzzle John Bull's commercial mind, and to cloak a deep-laid political scheme, has been masterly exposed by Mr. Disraeli during the address debates[e]. The substance of his revelation was this:

"Some years ago, the Emperor of the French made a communication similar to the letter lately addressed by him to the Minister of the Interior[f], in which communication he proposed the entire extinction of the prohibitive system, and the adoption of measures similar to those contained in his late manifesto[g]. In 1856, a bill in this sense was introduced into the Corps Législatif [...], but, before being passed, was laid before the 86 Provincial Councils of France[h], which, with the exception of 6, all adopted the proposal with an understanding that a certain period of time should elapse before the new system should be brought into play. Consequently, the Emperor agreeing with this proposition, some public document expressed his resolution to carry this system into effect, and appointed July, 1861, as the period with which it should commence." All, therefore, that France engages by the treaty to do in July, 1861, "was already provided by the course of law in France."

Notes