THE WAR QUESTION IN EUROPE[1]

Whether, however, the Czar will accept this proposal, or trust to his army, remains to be seen. He cannot afford to go through such armaments and dislocations of troops over his vast Empire once in every five years. The preparations have been made on such a scale that a very great material gain only can repay their cost. The Russian population is thoroughly roused to warlike enthusiasm. We have seen a copy of a letter from a Russian merchant not one of the many German, English, or French traders, who have settled in Moscow but a real old Muscovite, a genuine son of Sviataia Russ[d], who holds some goods on consignment for English account, and had been asked whether in case of war these goods would run the risk of confiscation. The old Russ, quite indignant at the imputation thus cast upon his Government, and perfectly well acquainted with the official phraseology, according to which Russia is the great champion of "order, property, family, and religion," in contrast to the revolutionary and socialist countries of the West, retorts that

"Here in Russia, God be praised, the distinction between mine and thine is yet in full force, and your property here is as safe as anywhere. I would even advise you to send over as much of your property as you can, for it will perhaps be safer here than where it is now. As to lour countrymen, you may perhaps have reason to fear, as to your property, not at all."[4]

In the meantime, the armaments prepared in England and France are upon a most extensive scale. The French ocean squadron has been ordered from Brest to Toulon in order to transport troops to the Levant. Forty or sixty thousand, according to different statements, are to be sent, a large portion of them to be drafted from the African army; the expedition will be very strong in riflemen, and be commanded either by Baraguay d'Hilliers or by St. Arnaud. The British Government will send about 18,000 men (22 regiments of 850 each) and at the date of our last advices[e], a portion of them had already embarked for Malta, where the general rendezvous is to be. The infantry go in steamers, and sailing vessels are employed for the conveyance of cavalry. The Baltic fleet, which is to be concentrated off Sheerness, in the Thames, by the 6th of March, will consist of fifteen ships of the line, eight frigates, and seventeen smaller vessels. It is the largest fleet the British have got together since the last war; and as one half of it will consist of paddle or screw steamers, and as the rating and weight of metal is at present about 50 per cent. higher than fifty years ago, this Baltic fleet may prove to be the strongest armament ever turned out by any country. Sir Charles Napier is to command it; if there is to be war, he is the man to bring his guns to bear at once upon the decisive point.

On the Danube, the battle of Chetatea[f] has evidently had the effect of delaying the Russian attack upon Kalafat. The Russians have been convinced by that five days' struggle that it will be no easy matter to take an intrenched camp which can send out such sallies. It seems that even the positive command of the Autocrat himself is not sufficient, after such a foretaste, to drive his troops to a rash attempt. The presence of Gen. Schilder, Chief of the Engineers, who was sent from Warsaw on purpose, seems even to have had a result contrary to the Imperial order, for instead of hurrying on the attack, an inspection of the fortifications from a distance was sufficient to convince him that more troops and more heavy guns were needed than could at once be brought up. Accordingly the Russians have been concentrating whatever forces they could around Kalafat, and bringing up their siege guns, of which, it seems, they brought seventy-two into Wallachia. The London Times estimates their forces at 65,000 men, which is rather high, if we consider the strength of the whole Russian army in the Principalities[g]. This army now consists of six divisions of infantry, three divisions of cavalry, and about three hundred field-guns, besides Cossacks, riflemen, and other special corps, of a total nominal strength before the beginning of the war, of 120,000 men. Assuming their losses, by sickness and on the battle-field, to be 30,000 men, there remain about 90,000 combatants. Of these, at least 35,000 are required to guard the line of the Danube, to garrison the principal towns, and to maintain the communications. There would remain, then, at the very outside, 55,000 men for an attack upon Kalafat.

Now look at the respective positions of the two armies. The Russians neglecting the whole line of the Danube, disregarding the position of Omer Pasha at Shumla, direct their main body, and even their heavy artillery, to a point on their extreme right where they are further from Bucharest, their immediate base of operations, than the Turks are. Their rear is therefore as much exposed as it possibly can be. What is worse still is that, in order to get some slight protection for their rear, they are obliged to divide their forces, and to appear before Kalafat with a force which by no means has that evident superiority which, by insuring success, might justify such a maneuver. They leave from thirty to forty per cent of their army scattered behind the main body, and these troops are certainly not capable of repelling a resolute attack. Thus, neither is the conquest of Kalafat assured, nor the communications of the besieging army placed out of the reach of danger. The blunder is so evident, so colossal, that nothing short of absolute certainty of the fact can make a military man believe that it has been committed.

If Omer Pasha, who still has a superior force disposable, passes the Danube at any point between Rustchuk and Hirsova, with say seventy thousand men, the Russian army must either be annihilated to the last man or take refuge in Austria. He has had a full month for concentrating such a mass. Why does he not cross a river which is now no longer obstructed by floating ice? Why does he not even retake his tête-de-pont at Oltenitza, in order to be able to move at any moment? That Omer Pasha is ignorant of the chances the Russians have given him by their unheard-of blunder is impossible. He must, it would seem, be tied by diplomatic action. His inactivity must be intended to form an offset against the naval promenade of the combined fleets in the Black Sea. The Russian army must not be annihilated or driven to take refuge in Austria, because then peace would be endangered by fresh complications. And in order to suit the intrigues and the sham-action of diplomatic jobbers, Omer Pasha must allow the Russians to bombard Kalafat, to place their whole army, all their siege artillery at his mercy, without his being allowed to profit by the occasion. It would indeed seem that if the Russian commander[h] had not had a material, positive guarantee that his flanks and rear would not be attacked, he would never have attempted to march upon Kalafat. Otherwise, in spite of all stringent instructions, he would deserve to be tried at the drum-head and shot. And unless, by the steamer now due here, or at furthest within a few days, we hear that Omer Pasha has crossed the Danube and marched upon Bucharest, it will be scarcely possible to avoid the conclusion that a formal agreement of the Western Powers has been made to the effect that in order to satisfy the military point of honor of Russia, Kalafat is to be sacrificed without the Turks being allowed to defend it by the only way it can be effectually defended by an offensive movement lower down the Danube.[5]

Notes

[176] The peace treaty of Adrianople was concluded by Turkey and Russia in September 1829, at the end of the war of 1828-29. Under it Russia obtained the islands in the mouth of the Danube and a considerable part of the eastern coast of the Black Sea south of the Kuban estuary. Turkey was obliged to recognise the autonomy of the Danubian Principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia and grant them the right to elect hospodars (rulers) independently. Russia was to guarantee this autonomy, which was tantamount to establishing a Russian protectorate over the Principalities. The Turkish Government also pledged to guarantee the autonomy of Greece and Serbia.