The Documents on the Partition of Turkey^[68]

London, Tuesday, March 21, 1854

A most important event is the compulsory publication by Ministers of their secret correspondence with the Emperor of Russia during the first three months of their administration, as also of the memorandum of the interview between the Czar and Lord Aberdeen in 1844, which the Journal de St. Pétersbourg challenged the latter to produce.[69]

I begin with an analysis of the "memorandum" by Count Nesselrode, delivered to Her Majesty's Government, and founded on communications from the Emperor of Russia, subsequent to his visit to England in June, 1844. The present status quo of the Ottoman Empire is "the most compatible with the general interest of 1 he maintenance of peace." England and Russia agree on this principle, and therefore unite their efforts to keep up that Status quo.

"With this object, the essential point is to suffer the Porte to live in repose, without needlessly disturbing it by diplomatic bickerings, and without interfering, without absolute necessity, in its internal affairs."

Now, how is this "system of forbearance" to be successfully carried out? Firstly, by Great Britain not interfering with the interpretation Russia may think fit to put upon her treaties with the Porte, but forcing it, on the contrary, to act in conformity with those treaties as interpreted by Russia; and, in the second place, by allowing Russia "constantly" to meddle between the Sultan and his Christian subjects. In a word, "the system of forbearance" toward the Porte means a system of complicity with Russia. This strange proposition is, however, far from being expressed in rude terms.

The memorandum affects to speak of "all the great Powers," but at the same time plainly intimates that there exist no great Powers at all besides Russia and England. France, it is said, will

"find herself obliged to act in conformity with the course agreed upon between St. Petersburg and London."

Austria is represented as a mere appendage to Russia, enjoying no life of her own, following no distinct policy, but one "closely united by the principle of perfect identity" with that of Russia. Prussia is treated as a nonentity, not worth mentioning, and consequently is not so much as mentioned. "All the great Powers," then, is only a rhetorical figure for the two Cabinets of St. Petersburg and London; and the line of conduct to be agreed upon by all the great Powers means the line of conduct drawn up at St. Petersburg and to be acted upon at London. The memorandum says:

"The Porte has a constant tendency to extricate itself from the engagements imposed upon it by the treaties which it has concluded with other powers. It hopes to do so with impunity, because it reckons on the mutual jealousy of the Cabinets. It thinks that if it fails in its engagements toward one of them, the rest will espouse its quarrel, and will screen it from all responsibility.

"It is essential not to confirm the Porte in this delusion. Every time that it fails in its obligations toward one of the great Powers, it is the interest of all the rest to make it sensible of its error, and seriously to exhort it to act rightly toward the Cabinet which demands just reparation.

"As soon as the Porte shall perceive that it is not supported by the other Cabinets, it will give way, and the differences which have arisen will be arranged in a conciliatory manner, without any conflict resulting from them."

This is the formula by which England is called upon to assist Russia in her policy of extorting new concessions from Turkey, oh the ground of her ancient treaties.

"In the present state of feeling in Europe, the Cabinets cannot see with indifference the Christian populations in Turkey exposed to flagrant acts of oppression or religious intolerance. It is necessary constantly to make the Ottoman Ministers sensible of this truth, and to persuade them that they can only reckon on the friendship and on the support of the great Powers on the condition that they trea the Christian subjects of the Porte with toleration and with mildness...

"It will be the duty of the foreign representatives, guided by these principles, to act among themselves in a perfect spirit of agreement. If they address remonstrances to the Porte, those remonstrances must bear a real character of unanimity, though divested of one of exclusive dictation."

In this mild way England is taught how to back Russia's pretensions to a religious Protectorate over the Christians of Turkey.

Having thus laid down the premises of her "policy of forbearance", Russia cannot conceal from her confidante that this very forbearance may prove more fatal than any policy of aggression, and fearfully contribute to develop all the "elements of dissolution" the Ottoman Empire contains: so that some fine morning

"unforeseen circumstances may hasten its fall, without its being in the power of the friendly Cabinets to prevent it."

The question is then raised: what would have to be done in the event of such unforeseen circumstances producing a final catastrophe in Turkey.

The only thing wanted, it is said, in the event of Turkey's fall becoming imminent, is England and Russia's "coming to a previous understanding before having recourse to action." "This notion," we are assured by the memorandum, "was in principle agreed upon during the Emperor's last residence in London" (in the long conferences held between the Autocrat on the one hand, and the Duke of Wellington, Sir Robert Peel, and the Earl of Aberdeen on the other hand). The result was

"the eventual engagement that, if anything unforeseen occurred in Turkey, Russia and England should previously concert together as to the course which they should pursue in common.

Now, what means this eventual engagement? Firstly, that Russia and England should previously come to a common understanding as to the partition of Turkey; and secondly, that in such a case, England was to bind herself to form a Holy Alliance with Russia and Austria, described as Russia's alter ego, against France, who would be "obliged", i.e., forced to act in conformity with their views. The natural result of such a common understanding would be to involve England in a deadly war with France, and thus to give Russia full sway to carry out her own policy on Turkey.

Great stress is again and again laid upon the "unforeseen circumstances" that may accelerate the downfall of Turkey. At the conclusion of the memorandum the mysterious phrase, however, disappears, to be replaced by the more distinct formulation: "If we foresee that the Ottoman Empire must crumble to pieces, England and Russia have to enter into a previous concert, etc..." The only unforeseen circumstance, then, was the unforeseen declaration on the part of Russia that the Ottoman Empire must now crumble to pieces. The main point gained by the eventual engagement is the liberty granted to Russia to foresee, at a given moment, the sudden downfall of Turkey, and to oblige England to enter into negotiations, on the common understanding of such a catastrophe being at hand.

Accordingly, about ten years after the memorandum had been drawn up, due notice is given to England that the vitality of the Ottoman Empire is gone, and that they had now to enter upon their previously arranged concert to the exclusion of France, i.e. to conspire behind the backs of Turkey and France. This overture opens the series of secret and confidential papers exchanged between St. Petersburg and the Coalition Cabinet.

Sir G. H. Seymour, the British Embassador at St. Petersburg, sends his first secret and confidential dispatch to Lord J. Russell, the then Foreign Minister, on January 11, 1853. On the evening of the 9th January he had the "honor" to see the Emperor at the Palace of the Grand Duchess Helen[a], who had condescended to invite Lady Seymour and himself to meet the Imperial family. The Emperor came up to him in his most gracious manner, expressing his great pleasure at the news of the formation of the Coalition Cabinet, to which he wished long life, desiring the Embassador to convey to old Aberdeen his congratulation on his part, and to beat into Lord John Russell's brains

"that it was very essential that the two Governments—the English Government and I, and I and the English Government—should be on the best terms; and that the necessity was never greater than at present."

Mark that these words were spoken in January, 1853, at the very time when Austria, "between whom and Russia" according to the memorandum "there exists an entire conformity of principles in regard to the affairs of Turkey," was openly engaged in troubling the waters at Montenegro.

"When we are agreed," said the Czar, "it is immaterial what the others may think or do. Turkey," he continued, in a hypocritical manner of condolence, "is in a very critical state, and may give us all a great deal of trouble."

Having said so much, the Czar proceeded to shake hands with Sir H. Seymour, very graciously, as if about to take leave of him; but Sir Hamilton, to whom it "instantly occurred that the conversation was incomplete," took "the great liberty" humbly to pray the Autocrat to "speak a little more explicitly with regard to the affairs of Turkey."

"The Emperor's words and manner," remarks this observer, "although still very kind, showed that His Majesty had no intention of speaking to me of the demonstration which he is about to make in the South."

Be it remarked that already in his dispatch of Jan. 7, 1853, Sir Hamilton had informed the British Government that

"orders had been dispatched to the 5th corps d'armée to advance to the frontiers of the Danubian provinces..., and that the 4th corps ... would be ordered to hold itself in readiness to march if necessary;"

and in a dispatch dated Jan. 8, 1853, that Nesselrode had expressed to him his opinion of the "necessity that the diplomacy of Russia should be supported by a demonstration of force."

"The Emperor," Sir Hamilton continues his dispatch[b], "said, at first with a little hesitation, but, as he proceeded, in an open and unhesitating manner:

"'The affairs of Turkey are in a very disorganized condition; the country itself seems to be falling to pieces (menace ruine); the fall will be a great misfortune, and it is very important that England and Russia should come to a perfectly good understanding upon these affairs, and that neither should take any decisive step of which the other is not apprized.'

"'Stay,' he exclaimed, 'we have on our hands a sick man, a very sick man: it will be, I tell you frankly, a great misfortune if, one of these days, he should slip away from us, especially before all necessary arrangements were made. But, however, this is not the time to speak to you on that matter.'"

The patient, in this bear's eyes, is so weak that he must eat him. Sir Hamilton, somewhat frightened at this "unforeseen" diagnostic of the Muscovite physician, answers in the true spirit of courtesy:

"Your Majesty is so gracious that you will allow me one further observation. Your Majesty says the man is sick; it is very true; but Your Majesty will deign to excuse me if I remark, that it is the part of the generous and strong to treat with gentleness the sick and feeble man."

The British Embassador comforts himself by the consideration, that this concurrence on his part in the Czar's view of Turkey and sickness and his appeal to forbearance with the sick man did "at least not give offense." Thus ends Sir H. Seymour's report on his first confidential conversation with the Czar; but, although appearing a perfect courtier in this vis-à-vis, he has sufficient good sense to warn his Cabinet and to tell them what follows:

"Any overture of this kind only tends to establish a dilemma. The dilemma seems to be this: If Her Majesty's Government do not come to an understanding with Russia as to what is to happen in the event of the sudden downfall of Turkey, they will have the less reason for complaining if results displeasing to England should be prepared. If, on the contrary, Her Majesty's Government should enter into the consideration of such eventualities, they make themselves in some degree consenting parties to a catastrophe which they have so much interest in warding off as long as possible."

Sir Hamilton winds up his dispatch with the following epigrammatic sentence:

"The sum is probably this, that England has to desire a close concert with Russia, with a view to preventing the downfall of Turkey—while Russia would be well pleased that the concert should apply to the events by which this downfall is to be followed."

On the 14th of January, as Sir G. H. Seymour informs Lord J. Russell, in his dispatch dated 22d January, 1853, he had another confidential interview with the Czar, whom "he found alone." The Autocrat condescended to give the English Embassador a lesson in Eastern affairs. The dreams and plans of the Empress Catherine II were known, but he did not indulge in them. On the contrary, in his opinion there existed, perhaps, only one danger for Russia, that of a further extension of his already too vast dominions. (Your readers will recollect that I alluded to this in extracting a passage from the dispatches of Count Pozzo di Borgo[70]). The status quo of Turkey was the most consonant with Russian interests. On the one hand, the Turks had lost their spirit of military enterprise, and on the other,

"this country was strong enough, or had hitherto been strong enough, to preserve its independence and to ensure respectful treatment from other countries."

But in that empire there happened to be several millions of Christians he must take care of, hard and "inconvenient" as the task might be. To do this he was bound at once by his right, his duty and his religion. Then, all of a sudden, the Czar returned to his parable of the sick man, the very sick man, whom they must by no means allow "to suddenly die on their hands" (de leur échapper).[71]

"Chaos, confusion, and the certainty of a European war, must attend the catastrophe if it should occur unexpectedly, and before some ulterior scheme had been sketched."

Having, thus, again given notice of the impending death of the Ottoman Empire, the summons to England followed in conformity with the "eventual engagement" to discount the heritage in common with Russia. "Still, he avoids sketching his own ulterior system," contenting himself by establishing, in a parliamentary way, the main point to be kept in view in the event of a partition.

"I desire to speak to you as a friend and a gentleman. If England and I arrive at an understanding of this matter, as regards the rest, it matters little to me; it is indifferent to me what others do or think. Frankly, then, I tell you plainly, that if England thinks of establishing herself one of these days at Constantinople, I will not allow it. I do not attribute this intention to you, but it is better on these occasions to speak plainly; for my part, I am equally disposed to take the engagement not to establish myself there, as proprietor that is to say, for as occupier I do not say; it might happen that circumstances, if no previous provision were made, if everything should be left to chance, might place me in the position of occupying Constantinople."

England, therefore, will be forbidden to establish herself at Constantinople. The Czar will do so, if not as proprietor, at least in the quality of a temporary occupier. The British Embassador thanked His Majesty for the frankness of this declaration. Nicholas then alluded to his past conversation with the Duke of Wellington, of which the memorandum of 1844 is the record, and, as it were, the résumé. Passing to the question of the day to his claims to the Holy Places the British Embassador expressed his fears:

"Two consequences that might be anticipated from the appearance of a Russian army—the one being the counter-demonstration which might be provoked on the part of France; the other, and the more serious, the rising, on the part of the Christian population, against the Sultan's authority, already so much weakened by revolts, and by a severe financial crisis. The Emperor assured me that no movement of his forces had yet taken place (n'ont pas bougé), and expressed his hope that no advance would be required. With regard to a French Expedition to the Sultan's dominions, His Majesty intimated that such a step would bring affairs to an immediate crisis; that a sense of honor would compel him to send his forces into Turkey without delay or hesitation: that if the result of such an advance should prove to be the overthrow of the Great Turk (le Grand Turc), he should regret the event, but should feel that he had acted as he was compelled to do."

The Czar has now given England the theme she has to work out, viz: to sketch an "ulterior system" for superseding the Ottoman Empire, and "to enter into a previous concert as to everything relating to the establishment of a new order of things, intended to replace that which now exists." He encouraged his pupil by holding forth the prize he might gain from a successful solution of this problem, dismissing him with the paternal advice:

"A noble triumph would be obtained by the civilization of the Nineteenth century, if the void left by the extinction of Mohammedan rule in Europe could be filled up without an interruption of the general peace, in consequence of the precautions adopted by the two principal Governments the' most interested in the destinies of Turkey."

England being thus summoned, Lord J. Russell appears and sends in his answer in a secret and confidential dispatch dated Feb. 9, 1853. If Lord John had been fully aware of the Czar's perfidious plan to press England into a false position by the mere fact of her entering into secret communications with him, as to the future partition of an allied State, he would have acted like the Czar, and have contented himself with making a verbal reply to Baron Brunnow, instead of dispatching an official State paper to St. Petersburg. Before the secret papers were laid before the House, The Times had described Lord John's dispatch as a most powerful and "indignant refusal" of the Czar's proposals[c]. In its yesterday's number it withdraws its own eulogy of Lord John, declaring that "the document does not deserve the praise it had been led, on imperfect information, to apply to it[d]". Lord John incurred the wrath of The Times in consequence of his declaration, in Friday's sitting of the Commons[e], that he certainly was not in the habit of making communications to that paper, and that he had not even read the article alluding to his answer to Sir G. H. Seymour until three days after its publication.

Any one acquainted with the humble and abject tone assumed by every English Minister since 1814, Canning not even excepted, in their communications with Russia, will be forced to own that Lord John's dispatch is to be regarded as a heroic performance on the part of that little earthman.

The document having the character of an important contribution to history, and being proper to illustrate the development of negotiations, your readers will be glad to be acquainted with it in extenso.

The question raised by His Imperial Majesty is a very serious one. It is, supposing the contingency of the dissolution of the Turkish Empire to be probable, or even imminent, whether it is not better to be provided beforehand for a contingency than to incur the chaos, confusion, and the certainty of a European war, all of which must attend the catastrophe if it should occur unexpectedly, and before some ulterior system has been sketched; this is the point, said His Imperial Majesty, to which I am desirous that you should call the attention of your Government.

"In considering this grave question, the first reflection that occurs to Her Majesty's Government is that no actual crisis has occurred which renders necessary a solution of this vast European problem. Disputes have arisen respecting the Holy Places, but these are without the sphere of the internal government of Turkey, and concern Russia, and France rather than the Sublime Porte. Some disturbance of the relations between Austria and the Porte has been caused by the Turkish attack on Montenegro; but this again relates rather to dangers affecting the frontier of Austria, than the authority and safety of the Sultan; so that there is no sufficient cause for intimating to the Sultan that he cannot keep peace at home, or preserve friendly relations with his neighbors.

It occurs further to Her Majesty's Government to remark, that the event which is contemplated is not definitely fixed in point of time. When William III and Louis XIV disposed, by treaty, of the succession of Charles II, of Spain[72], they were providing for an event which could not be far off. The infirmities of the sovereign of Spain, and the certain end of any human life, made the contingency in prospect both sure and near. The death of the Spanish king was in no way hastened by the treaty of partition. The same thing may be said of the provision made in the last century for the disposal of Tuscany[73] upon the decease of the last prince of the house of Medici[f]. But the contingency of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire is of another kind. It may happen twenty, fifty, or a hundred years hence.

In these circumstances it would hardly be consistent with the friendly feelings toward the Sultan which animate the Emperor of Russia, no less than the Queen of Great Britain, to dispose beforehand of the provinces under his dominion. Besides this consideration, however, it must be observed, that an agreement made in such a case tends very surely to hasten the contingency for which it is intended to provide. Austria and France could not, in fairness, be kept in ignorance of the transaction, nor would such concealment be consistent with the end of preventing a European war. Indeed, such concealment cannot be intended by His Imperial Majesty. It is to be inferred that, as soon as Great Britain and Russia should have agreed on the course to be pursued, and have determined to enforce it, they should communicate their intentions to the Great Powers of Europe. An agreement thus made and thus communicated would not be very long a secret; and while it would alarm and alienate the Sultan, the knowledge of its existence would stimulate all his enemies to increased violence and more obstinate conflict. They would fight with the conviction that they must ultimately triumph; while the Sultan's generals and troops would feel that no immediate success could save their cause from final overthrow. Thus would be produced and strengthened that very anarchy which is now feared and the foresight of the friends of the patient would prove the cause of his death.

Her Majesty's Government need scarcely enlarge on the dangers attendant on the execution of any similar convention. The example of the Succession War[g] is enough to show how little such agreements are respected when a pressing temptation urges their violation. The position of the Emperor of Russia as depositary, but not proprietor, of Constantinople, would be exposed to numberless hazards, both from the long-cherished ambition of his own nation and the jealousies of Europe. The ultimate proprietor, whoever he might be, would hardly be satisfied with the inert, supine attitude of the heirs of Mohammed II. A great influence on the affairs of Europe seems naturally to belong to the Sovereign of Constantinople, holding the gates of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

That influence might be used in favor of Russia; it might be used to control and curb her power.

His Imperial Majesty has justly and wisely said: My country is so vast, so happily circumstanced in every way, that it would be unreasonable in me to desire more territory or more power than I possess. On the contrary, he observed, our great, perhaps our only danger, is that which would arise from an extension given to an Empire already too large. A vigorous and ambitious State, replacing the Sublime Porte, might, however, render war on the part of Russia a necessity for the Emperor or his successors.

Thus European conflict would arise from the very means taken to prevent it; for neither England nor France, nor probably Austria, would be content to see Constantinople permanently in the hands of Russia.

On the part of Great Britain, Her Majesty's Government at once declare that they renounce all intention or wish to hold Constantinople. His Imperial Majesty may be quite secure upon this head. They are likewise ready to give an assurance that they will enter into no agreement to provide for the contingency of the fall of Turkey without previous communication with the Emperor of Russia.

Upon the whole, then, Her Majesty's Government are persuaded that no course of policy can be adopted more wise, more disinterested, more beneficial to Europe than that which His Imperial Majesty has so long followed, and which will render his name more illustrious than that of the most famous sovereigns who have sought immortality by unprovoked conquest and ephemeral glory.

With a view to the success of this policy, it is desirable that the utmost forbearance should be manifested toward Turkey; that any demands which the Great Powers of Europe may have to make should be made matter of friendly negotiation rather than of peremptory demand; that military and naval demonstrations to coerce the Sultan should as much as possible be avoided; that differences with respect to matters affecting Turkey, within the competence of the Sublime Porte, should be decided after mutual concert between the Great Powers, and not be forced upon the weakness of the Turkish Government.

To these cautions Her Majesty's Government wish to add that, in their view, it is essential that the Sultan should be advised to treat his Christian subjects in conformity with the principles of equity and religious freedom which prevail generally among the enlightened nations of Europe. The more the Turkish Government adopts the rules of impartial law and equal administration, the less will the Emperor of Russia find it necessary to apply that exceptional protection which His Imperial Majesty has found so burdensome and inconvenient, though no doubt prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty.

You may read this dispatch to Count Nesselrode, and, if it is desired, you may yourself place a copy of it in the hands of the Emperor. In that case you will accompany its presentation with those assurances of friendship and confidence on the part of Her Majesty the Queen, which the conduct of His Imperial Majesty was so sure to inspire.

I am &c.
J. Russell

I am obliged to postpone the conclusion of this analysis to my next letter[h]. Before concluding, however, I will give you, in addition to previous communications, the most recent news I have obtained, from a source not otherwise accessible to the public[74], regarding the attitude and plans of Prussia.[i]

When the conflict between Russia on the one hand, and the Anglo-French Alliance on the other, already reached a certain climax, the Emperor Nicholas dispatched an autograph letter to his brother-in-law[j] at Berlin, in which he stated that though England and France might do him some damage at sea he feared nothing from them on land, having 600,000 soldiers ready to take the field at the end of April. Of these he would place 200,000 at the disposition of Frederick William, if the latter engaged himself to march on Paris and dethrone Louis Napoleon. The imbecile king was so much taken in by this proposition that Manteuffel required three days' discussion to dissuade him from taking the pledge. So much for the king.

As to Herr von Manteuffel himself, the "great character"[k] of whom the Prussian middle classes are so proud, the whole man lies open, as in a nutshell, in his secret instructions sent to Mr. Bunsen, his Embassador at London, at the same period as the above Russian letter was received, and which came into my possession through certainly a different manner than that by which Mr. Bunsen possessed himself of my private letters[75]. The contents of these instructions, betraying in the arrogant ambiguity of their style at once the schoolmaster and the drill-sergeant, are nearly as follows: "Look sharp whence the wind blows. If you observe that England is in earnest alliance with France, and determined to push on the war, take your stand on the 'integrity and independence' of Turkey. If you observe her wavering in policy and disinclined to war, out with your lance and break it cheerfully for the honor and character of the king, my master and yours."

Is the Autocrat wrong then in treating Prussia as a non-entity?

Notes

[75] Here Marx has in mind the fact that he was constantly shadowed by the Prussian Government. Among the organisers of this surveillance in the 1850s was Bunsen, the Prussian Ambassador to London, who received a certain assistance from the British authorities. In their correspondence Marx and Engels repeatedly mentioned that their letters had been opened.